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OSA-2273-62
20 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director/OEA

SUBJECT : Determination of "Must-Know" for Access to
Ultra-Sensitive Projects Managed by OEA

1. At the moment a policy paper is on the desk of Dr. Charyk awaiting his signature. This paper enunciates the overall Security policy for the NRP.
2. With regard to the responsibility for determining "must-know" the following paragraph appears:

Approval of "must-know" for all individuals associated with the NRP will be made by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) and specifically designated senior Program officials. Employees and officials of U. S. Government departments, agencies and offices who are not directly involved in the NRP but for whom access to NRP project information is deemed essential, must be approved by the DNRO or his designee. This includes policy officials of the U. S. Government who require knowledge of the reconnaissance effort but not the specific details of the separate projects."

3. It is presumed that the aforementioned Security policy paper will be signed by Dr. Charyk in the immediate future and accordingly will be law. I suggest that we should consider how this particular paragraph will affect the manner in which we operate.

4. Since 1955 OEA and its predecessor units of CIA have been the final authority in determining who should be briefed into Projects I, C, A or O. OEA authority in this area, of course, was always subject to the concurrence of Mr. Rissell when he was the DD/P and higher authority in the Agency. At the present time all requests for Security approval for access to these four programs are processed through the Security Branch, OEA, which unit effects necessary coordination with/ OEA and indicates whether or not the Office concurs that the candidate for clearance possess "must-know".

5. The quoted extract of the Security policy paper quoted in paragraph 2 above deals with two categories of candidates for project clearance. These categories are treated separately below:

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a. Approval of "must-know" for all individuals associated with the HRP will be made by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) and specifically designated senior Program officials. It is presumed that Colonel Jack Ledford will be specifically designated by the DNRO as an approving authority for all individuals actually participating in Projects I, A, C & O. It is further assumed that the Security Branch will continue to monitor the processing of clearance requests to insure the existence of "must-know" for such individuals. It would appear, however, that the HRO staff (in the name of DNRO) will be enabled to approve "must-know" for any individuals in this category without obtaining the prior concurrence of OSA, (e.g., DNRO can approve Project "O" clearances for all members of the staff of HRO).

b. ... Employees and officials of U. S. Government departments, agencies and offices who are not directly involved in the HRP but for whom access to HRP project information is deemed essential, must be approved by the DNRO or his designee. This includes policy officials of the U. S. Government who require knowledge of the reconnaissance effort but not the specific details of the separate projects. This segment of the paragraph in question indicates that officials of the U. S. Government not directly involved in the HRP will be approved as to "must-know" by the DNRO or his "designee". It is hoped that Colonel Jack Ledford will be identified as the "designee" of the DNRO for this purpose. Otherwise, it would be necessary for this Agency to obtain the "must-know" approval of the DNRO before we could brief, for example, a Congressman, an official of the Bureau of the Budget, an official of the White House staff, an official of the State Department, etc.

c. In any event since the DNRO possesses approval authority for determining "must-know" for Projects I, C, A & O and since there is no requirement that OSA be informed of the individuals subsequently cleared, the OSA will not necessarily be kept apprised of various Government officials being briefed into these ultra-sensitive programs unless it is desired to establish a control mechanism whereby we will be informed periodically of the individuals recently briefed.

d. It is suggested that all recipients of this memorandum who feel that the probable change in the final authority for determining "must-know" will affect their particular area of responsibility communicate such

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feelings to the undersigned for coordination and referral to the AD/OSA.

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Chief, Security Branch
OSA

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